U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

15.1.5 APPENDIX A RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MAIN STEAM LINE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT OF A PWR

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary - Accident Evaluation Branch (AEB)

Secondary - Reactor Systems Branch (RSB)

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

The SRP Section 15.1.5 covers the review by the Reactor Systems Branch (RSB) of the main steam line break (MSLB) accident outside the containment of a PWR plant, including the response of the reactor and plant systems, the potential for fuel failure and the effect on the core thermal margins. This Appendix A of SRP Section 15.1.5 covers the review by the AEB of the radiological consequences of the MSLB accident. The review includes the following:

1. Review of the sequence of events, as described by the applicant, with and without offsite power available, to assure that the most severe case of radioactive releases has been considered,

2. Review of the models and assumptions used by the applicant for the calculation of the thyroid and whole-body doses for the postulated accident,

3. Independent calculation by the staff of the thyroid and whole-body doses for the MSLB accident,

4. Comparison of the doses calculated by the applicant and by the staff with appropriate exposure guidelines, as stated in subsection II below,

5. Evaluation of the technical specifications on the primary and secondary coolant iodine activities, and

6. Two cases for the reactor coolant iodine concentration corresponding to (a) a preaccident iodine spike and (b) a concurrent iodine spike.

A secondary review is performed by the RSB and the results are used by AEB in the overall evaluation of the MSLB radiological consequence analysis. The potential for fuel failures resulting from the postulated MSLB accident is routinely evaluated by the RSB under SRP Section 15.1.5 and the results will be provided to the AEB as an additional source of iodine activity in the reactor coolant for consideration in the evaluation of the MSLB radiological consequences.

The review of the technical specifications is coordinated with and performed by the Licensing Guidance Branch as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 16.0. The acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The acceptance criteria are based on the relevant requirements of 10 CFR Part 100 as related to the radiological consequences of a postulated accident. The plant site and the dose mitigating engineered safety features are acceptable with respect to the radiological consequences of a postulated MSLB outside containment of a PWR facility if the calculated whole-body and thyroid doses at the exclusion area and the low population zone outer boundaries do not exceed the following exposure guidelines:

1. for an MSLB with an assumed preaccident iodine spike and for an MSLB with the highest worth control rod stuck out of the core, the calculated doses should not exceed the guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100, Section 11 (Ref. 1), and

2. for an MSLB with the equilibrium iodine concentration for continued full power operation in combination with an assumed accident initiated iodine spike, the calculated doses should not exceed a small fraction of the above guideline values, i.e., 10 percent or 2.5 rem and 30 rem respectively, for the whole-body and thyroid doses.

The methodology and assumptions for calculating the radiological consequences should reflect the regulatory positions of Regulatory Guide 1.4 (Ref. 8) except for the atmospheric dispersion factors which are reviewed under SRP Section 2.3.4.

Plant technical specifications are required for the iodine activity in the primary and secondary coolant system and for the leak rate from the primary to the secondary coolant system in the steam generator(s). These specifications are acceptable if the calculated potential radiological consequences from the MSLB accident are within the exposure guidelines for the above two cases.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

The reviewer selects and emphasizes specific aspects of this SRP section as are appropriate for the particular plant. The review areas to be given attention and emphasis are determined by the similarity of the information presented in the SAR to that recently reviewed on other plants and whether items of special safety significance are involved.

At the construction permit stage, there is generally insufficient information available to make meaningful radiological consequence calculations for this

accident. At this stage, the review is limited to a brief review of the applicant's discussion of the main steam line failure accidents to determine that there are no unusual design features that would preclude the limitation of radiological consequences by appropriate limits on coolant concentrations and primary-to-secondary system leak rate. The detailed review of radiological consequences of the main steam line failure accident is done at the operating license stage when system parameters are fully developed.

The standard technical specifications for the NSSS of each of the three PWR vendors include limits on the primary and secondary coolant activities and primary-to-secondary leak rate. These limits are used by the staff in its independent dose calculations when plant specific technical specifications are not available. If the applicant proposes to use these standard limits and the plant is one of the standard NSSS/BOP plants for which the steam line failure accident has been evaluated generically with the standard coolant activity and leakage limits, then the reviewer need not reevaluate the offsite doses from this accident provided that the atmospheric dispersion factors (X/Q values) for the site under review are lower than the limiting X/Q used in the generic review of the standard plant steam line failure.

The review of main steam line failure accidents at the operating license stage consists of the following steps:

1. Review of the applicant's descriptions of the steam line failure accident, with and without offsite power. This includes a review of the time sequence of occurrence of events.

2. Review of the applicant's description of events by the RSB, including operator actions. Review of the sequence of events to assure that the most severe case from the standpoint of release of radioactive materials and calculated doses has been identified.

3. Determination of primary and secondary coolant activity equilibrium concentrations. The reviewer assumes the primary and secondary coolant activity concentrations allowed by the technical specifications (SAR Chapter 16 or the Standard Technical Specifications given in References 2, 3, or 4) as equilibrium concentrations prior to the accident.

4. Determination of iodine spiking effects. For the dose calculations the following two cases of iodine spiking are analyzed:

   (a) A reactor transient has occurred prior to the postulated MSLB and has raised the primary coolant iodine concentration to the maximum value permitted by the standard technical specifications (i.e., a preaccident iodine spike case). The primary coolant iodine concentration for this case is obtained from Figure 3.4-1 of the NSSS vendor standard technical specification (Ref. 2, 3, or 4) or from the plant specific technical specifications proposed in Chapter 16 of the applicant's SAR, as appropriate.

   (b) The reactor trip and/or primary system depressurization associated with the MSLB creates an iodine spike in the primary system (Refs. 5 and 6). The increase in primary coolant iodine concentration is estimated using a spiking model which assumes that the iodine release rate from the fuel rods to the primary coolant (expressed in curies per unit time) increases to a value 500 times greater than the release

rate corresponding to the iodine concentration at the equilibrium value stated in the NSSS vendor standard technical specifications or from the plant specific technical specifications, as appropriate (i.e., concurrent iodine spike case).

5. Evaluation of the effects of fuel failure. As a result of the MSLB accident, fuel failures can occur, releasing fission products into the reactor coolant and thus making additional activity available for release to the atmosphere. The RSB reviews, under SRP Section 15.1.5, the effects of the MSLB on the core thermal margins and the associated amount of fuel failures, assuming that the highest worth control rod is stuck at its fully withdrawn position. The RSB, as a secondary review branch, will inform the AEB of the fuel failure estimate. If the MSLB accident is predicted to cause such fuel failure, a dose analysis will be performed with the corresponding iodine activity but without a concurrent iodine spike.

6. Determination of the primary-to-secondary leakage. Normal operating primary-to-secondary leakage is assumed to exist in the steam generators. The leakage rate should be the maximum allowed by the technical specifications. This value is 1 gpm in the STS but may be lower if required because of the radiological consequences of a rod ejection accident. The leakage should be apportioned between affected and unaffected steam generator(s) in such a manner that the calculated dose is maximized.

7. Determination of iodine transport to the atmosphere. During periods of steam generator dry-out, all iodine transported to the secondary side by primary coolant leakage is assumed to be released to the atmosphere. During periods of total submergence of the tubes, the fraction of iodine released is equal to the flash fraction of the primary coolant leakage. Appropriate credit for scrubbing by the secondary coolant may also be claimed using models presented in Reference 7. Any iodine transferred to the secondary coolant system will become airborne at a rate which is a function of the steaming rate and iodine partition coefficient. An iodine partition coefficient of 100 between steam generator water and steam phases may be conservatively assumed, unless the applicant presents reasonable evidence that the use of some other value is justified.

8. Determination of atmospheric dispersion characteristics (X/Q values). The appropriate X/Q values are determined by the assigned meteorologist in accordance with SRP Section 2.3.4.

9. Calculation of the exclusion area boundary (EAB) and low population zone (LPZ) boundary doses. The reviewer performs an independent calculation of the doses for the steam line break accident, using the two iodine concentrations in item 4 above. The breathing rates and dose conversion factors are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.4 (Ref. 8).

10. Review of dose calculations. The whole-body and thyroid doses calculated by the staff and by the applicant are compared with the acceptance criteria stated in subsection II of this appendix. If the doses calculated by the staff are not within the exposure guidelines then the staff will reduce as necessary any of the following plant-specific technical specifications: the primary and/or secondary equilibrium iodine concentrations, maximum primary coolant iodine activity (preaccident spike), or primary-to-secondary system leak rate.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided by the applicant and that the applicant's analysis and the staff's independent calculations support conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report at the operating license stage:

The staff concludes that the distances to the exclusion area and to the low population zone outer boundaries for the (insert PLANT NAME) site, in conjunction with the operation of the dose mitigating ESF systems, are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the calculated radiological consequences of a postulated main steam line failure outside the containment do not exceed: (a) the exposure guidelines as set forth in 10 CFR Part 100 §100.11 for an MSLB with an assumed preaccident iodine spike or for an MSLB with the highest worth control rod stuck out of the core and (b) 10 percent of these exposure guidelines, for an MSLB with an equilibrium iodine concentration in combination with an assumed accident-generated iodine spike. The results of the staff's calculations are listed in Table 15.____.

The staff's conclusion is based on (1) the staff review of the applicant's analysis of the radiological consequences, (2) the independent dose calculation by the staff using conservative assumptions, including atmospheric dispersion factors as discussed in Chapter 2 of this report, and (3) the (INSERT NSSS VENDOR) Standard Technical Specifications for the iodine concentration in the primary and secondary coolant system, and for the primary-to-secondary leakage in the steam generators. The staff will review the (PLANT NAME) specific technical specifications to assure that the dose guidelines stated above are not exceeded.

At the construction permit stage, the following paragraph is included in the staff's safety evaluation report:

> On the basis of our experience with the evaluation of steam line and steam generator tube failure accidents for PWR plants of similar design, we have concluded that the consequences of these accidents can be controlled by limiting the permissible primary and secondary coolant system radioactivity concentrations and/or primary-to-secondary leak rates so that potential offsite doses are small. At the operating license stage, we will include appropriate limits on these parameters to be included in the plant technical specifications.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

The following provides guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the staff's plans for using this SRP section.

Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the staff in its evaluation of conformance with Commission regulations.

Implementation schedules for conformance to parts of the method described herein are contained in the referenced regulatory guide.

VI. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR Part 100, Section 11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."

2. Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering PWRs, NUREG-0212.

3. Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse PWRs, NUREG-0452.

4. Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox PWRs, NUREG-0103.

5. R. R. Bellamy, "A Regulatory Viewpoint of Iodine Spiking During Reactor Transients," Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc., 28 (1978).

6. W. F. Pasedag, "Iodine Spiking in BWR and PWR Coolant Systems," CONF-770708, 3-217 (1977).

7. A. K. Postma and P. S. Tam, "Iodine Behavior in a PWR Cooling System Following a Postulated Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident," NUREG-0409, USNRC, 1978.

8. Regulatory Guide 1.4, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss-of-Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors."